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Fiscal policy — I’ede,’al Governumen!. spending and taxing programs was given time dominant.
role in economic stabilization efforts during the decade of tire 1960’s. The income tax cut of 1964
was designed to accelerate time movement toward full employment after about three yea’s of what
was considered by some a rather slow rate of economic expansion following the recession of 1960—61.
The income tax surcharge and a rednction in the rate of increase in Government spending we’re
adopted in 1968 to curb the inflation of the last half of the 1960’s.
The theoretical rationale frequently given by stabilization officials for such reliance on fiscal actions
was the simple Keynesian multiplier analysis found in a large number of economic textbooks. The sim-
ple form of the Inultiplier process holds that an increase in Government expenditures or a decrease in
the rate of taxation induces repeated rounds of spending by consumers and business firms, resulting
in a multiple expansion of total spending. A multiple reduction of total spending is said to result
from fiscal changes opposite those just mentioned. This analysis gives little ‘recognition to the influ-
ence on total spending of financing a deficit, am’ disposing of a surplus, by altering the amount of Coy-
ern’ment borrowing from the general public or the rate of monetary expansion.
The extent to which this analysis guided the recommendations of stabilization authorities dur-
ing the 1960’s is indicated by an examination of the Arcnuar, REPoRTs of the President’s Council of
Economic Advisers (CEA). The multiplier process just mentioned played an important role in shap-
ing the CEA’s view of economic stabilization and was spelled out several times in the ANNUAL
REPORTS.
The CEA’s ANNcAL REPORT for 1964, Appendix A, outlined the multiplier process by which an
$11 billion tax cut would produce a $30 billion increase in total demand. According to this outline,
a tax cut of this size would first inc’rease consumption by $9 billion, mvhich in turn “would generate
still further increases in incomes and spending in an endless, but rapidly diminishing, chain.” This
would result in adding $18 billion to GNP from increased consumption alone “— not just once, but
year-in and year-out....” But the multiplier process is not complete at this point. In response to
rising income, expenditures for plant and equipment, inventories, residential construction, a nd state and
local government programs would expand, and by the multiplier process would ac/el another “$10 to
‘$14 billion to GNP.” In this analysis, however, no mention was made regarding time Government financ-
ing requirements of time proposed tax reduction.
In discussing the proposed income surtax as a mnea,ms of reducing inflation, the ANNUAL REPORT
for 1968 argued that the same multiplier process was relevant. Time CEA asserted, the eco-
nomic effects of a tax increase are the mirror-image of the expansionary effects accomplished by tax
reduction.”
The view that changes in Government expenditures and tax rates exercise a powerful influence
on total spending, without regard to changes in time volume of Government debt outstanding or ‘in
the rate of monetary expansion, has also been prevalent among many others, About four hundred
professional economists signed a statement supporting the Revenue Act of 1964 as a means of
stimulating total demand. Politicians, ‘public figures, and economic commentators imave come gen-
erally to support fiscal actions explicitly, hut ‘more frequently implicitly, on the basis of time simple
multiplier analysis.
This view has been challenged by a number of economists on time grounds that it does not
give adequate recognition to the financing of Government expenditures. They argue that Govern-
me’nt spending financed by taxes or borrowinmg from saving of the general public ‘may reduce other
spending to such an extent that there will be little, if any, net increase in total spending. This is
frequently referred to as the “crowding omit” of private expenditures by fiscal actions. According to these
economists, stabilization recomnmendations based on time prevailing multiplier analysis of the 1960’s
are erroneous.
The following article by Roger W. Spencer and William P. Yohc provides a survey of economic
theory from Adam Smith to the present regarding the influence of fiscal actions on economic activ-
ity. They find that “crowding out” has been the clonuuant view thiring the past tmco hundred years.
Moreover, the emphasis on thu simple Keynesian multiplier analysis in developing economic stabi-
lization programs during the 1960’s is not in general agreement with Keynes’ own views or with
post-Keynesian economics.
Roger W. Spencer is an economist of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. William P. Yohe
is Professor of Economics at Duke University amid was a visiting scholar at the Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis for a period of time in 1969 and 1970.
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Fiscal policy provides additional spendirmg
in a world of sparse spending op port munities.
But it does not provide a nemc source of
finance in a world where spendumg is con—
stm’aiued by sources of finance. Time govern—
n’ment expenditures are financed in debi
mmrarkets in competition with private expendi-
tures. The case least favorable to fiscal policy
is that in wlmiclm tire additional government
horroscing simply CROWDS OUT of the
market an equal (or conceivably even greater)
volumne of imorrowing that meould have financed
‘private expenditures. r (Italics and capitaliza-
tion added)
Changes in Covernment expenditures and taxes,
the policy arm of Keynesian economics, have come
under attack recently for their apparent failure to
secure desired stabilization goals. Several studies, in
this Review and elsewhere, have concluded that in-
creases in Government expenditures, which are not
accompanied by money creation, induce temporary
increases in nonminal GNP with no net effect over a
longer period of time,2 Monetary actions, in contrast,
have been found to exert an inmportant influence on
economic activity quite apart from fiscal develop-
mmments. Much of the rebuttal of these articles has
been focused on debating the strengths of the mone-
tary variables rather than the weaknesses of the fiscal
variables mm
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This article surveys a large body of economic litera-
ture, in search of some reasonable rationale which
could explain the poor showing of the Government
spending multipliers in the previously mentioned re-
duced-form statistical studies. Two possible reasons
why these multipliers fail to achieve the high magni-
tudes promised by a mathematical derivation of the
basic “Keynesian” mmmultiplier are that many Keynesian
models do not capture (1.) the displacement of
private spending by Government spending (the
“crowding-out” effect), or (2) leakages associated with
consumer or Governmental propensities to spend.
The leakages are usually accounted for in the more
sophisticated econometric models, resulting in lower
multipliers than those derived from the elementary
models, but failure to allow for the possibility of
crowding out nrakes even these multipliers higher
than warranted.
Wom-ldwide acceptance of the Keynesian theory,
and increasing Govcrnmuent intervention in economic
affairs, represent the trend of post-depression thinking
on stabilization policy! There seems to be a growing
belief, however, that fiscal policies developed and ap-
plied in a society operating at a low level of resource
utilization are not necessarily applicable under high-
employment, inflationary conditions. Further, the evi-
dence presented by one analyst casts doubt on the
efficacy of fiscal policies even during the deflationary
l930’s!
Pure fiscal actions, which entail changes only in
Government expenditure and tax programs, are rare;
most stabilization actions involve a mixture of (1)
‘The authors wish to acknowledge the helpful comments on
earlier drafts of: Leonall C. Andersen, Karl Bruaner, Keith
M. Carlson, E. C. Corrigan, John M. Cmilhertson, R. Alien
Gilbert, Thomas M. Havrilesky, Jerry L. Jordan, Michael W.
Keran, Laurence H. Meyer, and Clark A. Warburton, The
authors are solely responsible for the analysis and conclu-
sions presented in the article.
Ijoim M. Culbertson, Macroeconomic Theory and Stabiliza-
tion Policy (New York: McGraw-Full Book Company, 1968),
p. 463.
2
Leonall C. Andersen and Jerry L. Jordan, “Monetary and
Fiscal Actions: A Test of Their Relative Importance in
Economic Stabilization,” this Review (November 1968);
Leonall C. Andersen and Keith M. Carlson “A Monetarist
Model for Econonmic Stabilization,” this Review (April 1970);
Michael \V. Keran, “Monetary and Fiscal Influences on Eco-
nomic Activity — The Historical Evidence,” this Reciew (No-
vember 1969), and “Monetary and Fiscal Influences en
Economic Activity — The Foreign Experience,” this Review
(February 1970j; John Denver, “Monetary Model Building,”
Business Economnics (September 1969).Also, in this vein, see
Milton Friedman and David Meiselman, “The Relative Sta-
bility of Monetary Velocity and the Investment Mmmltip!ier in
the United States, 1897-1958,” in Stabilization Policies, Com-
mission en Money and Credit (Englc~voed Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963).
:mi’he monetary variables most often employed in these arti-
cles are changes in money and the monetary base. The
primary fiscal spending variable is changes in high-employ-
meat Covernment expenditures. For a defense of the fiscal
position, see h’lurray \Veidenbaem, “Is Fiscal Policy Dead?,”
Financial Analysts Jounmal (March-April, 1970) and E. C.
Corrigan, “The Measurement and Imnportance of Fiscal Policy
Changes,” Federal Reserve Bank of New York Monthly Re-
view (June 1970).
‘mSee, for examnple, Robert Lekachman, The Age of Keynes
(New York: Random House, 1966). The difficuty of gen-
eralizimmg “Keynes’ view” or “the Keynesians’ view” has been
pointed out by Axel Leijonhufvnd (“Keynes and the Key-
nesians: A Suggested Interpretation,” American Economic
Recicw, May 1967, Papers and Proceedings, p. 401).
One must he careful in applying the epithet ‘Keynesian’
mmowadavs. I propose to use it in the broadest possible
sense and let ‘Keynesian economics’ be synonynmomms with the
majority school’ macroeconomics which has evolved out of
the debates triggered by Keynes’s General Theory
Within the majority school, at least two major factions
live in recently peaceful hut nonetheless uneasy coexistence.
With snore brevity than accmmracy, they may he labeled the
‘Revolutionary Orthodoxy’ and the ‘Neoclassical Resurgence’.
The orthodoxy tends to slight monetary in favor of
fiscal stabilization policies. The neoclassical faction may be
sufficiently characterized by ne°ating these statements. .ks
described, the orthodoxy is hardiy a very reputable positiomm
at the present time. Its influence in the csmrrently most
fashionable fields has been steadily diminishing, but it
seems to have found a refuge in business cycle theory —
and, of course, in the teaching of undem’graduate macro—
econon’mmcs.
0
Keran, “Monetary and Fiscal Influences on Economic Activ-
ity — The Historical Evidence,” p. 23.
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fiscal (tax-financed Government spending), (2) mone-
tary (Federal Reserve actions) and (3) debt man-
agement (changes in the maturity or value of the
debt) policies. For example, the offering of Treasury
bonds to finance a deficit constitutes debt manage-
ment policy (or fiscal policy, by more conventional
definitions) at first, but the subsequent purc’hasc of
such bonds (or perhaps the failure to purchase such
bonds) by the Federal Reserve is generally construed
to be monetary policy. Thus the existence of Govern-
ment bonds clouds the distinction between the two
basic economic stabilization policies — monetaiy and
fiscal.
The method of financing Government expenditures
influences economic stabilization efforts, There ate
two conflicting views regarding the extent of this in-
fluence. Funds for Government spending are obtained
by taxing the public, borrowing from the public,
and/or money creation. Monetarists (those who favor
monetary over fiscal stabilization policies) generally
assert that Government spending financed by either
taxing or borrowing from the public is nmainly a re-
source transfer from the private sector to the Govern-
nment, with little net effect on total spending. Monetary
expansion, even if unaccompanied by an increase in
Government spending, has a strong, stimulative in-
fluence on the economy.
Contemporary Keynesian theory holds that all of
the three techniques of Government finance involve
something more than a simple resource transfer from
the private to the Government sector. An expansion-
ary eflect on the economy may be achieved by a rise
in Government spending matched by an increase in
tax receipts, or by a rise in Government spending
financed by bond issuance either to the public or the
monetary authorities.
The monetarists’ view that Government spending
financed by taxes or borrowing from the public merely
displaces, or “crowds out,” private spending is not a
new one. It was, in fact, the dominant view before
the Keynesian revolution of the 1930’s. Classical econ-
omists including Adam Smith and David Ricardo,
and neo-classicists including F. A. Hayek and R. C.
Hawtrcy, found little usc for fiscal stabilization efforts.
Keynes, at first a fairly orthodox neo-classical econo-
nmist, altered his views on many issues prior to the
publication of The General Theory of Employment,
Interest and Money, including a downgrading of the
fiscal crowding-out concept.” Since it was Keynes’
“John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of Employment,
Interest and Money (New Xork: Harcourt, Brace and Com-
pany, 1936). His book will be referred to as The General
Theory throughout the remainder of this article.
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theory of the proper use of fiscal policy svhich even-
tuallv became the dominant vie\s’, ‘s’e \vill develop at
some length Keynes’ thinking on the subject. Because
Keynes was strongly aware of the traditional neo-
classical views on fiscal theory, he hedged his argu-
ments nmore carefully than many of his successors.
Keynes’ General Theory analysis, in contrast to the
focus of the classical school on long-rnn supply factors,
was oriented toward short-run demand considerations.
Both views were couched preclomimmtly in real (ra-
ther than nominal) terms. Consequently, croxvding-
out analysis derived fronm either of these two ap-
proaches deals primarily with the displacement of
real private spending by Government spending.7
A summary of classical. neo-classical and Keynes’
early views on fiscal crowding out will be presented
first. Next, we svill trace Keynes’ later fiscal views,
underscoring the assumptions on which his final posi-
tion was built. The subsequent section examines bond-
and tax-financed crowding out, based principally on
a Keynesian analytical framework outlined by Rich-
ard Musgrave. Finally, we discuss alternative frame-
works and some empirical evidence bearing on the
crowding-out issue.
Summary of Classical, Neo-Classical and
Keynes’ Early Views on Fiscal Crowding Out
The mainstream of economic thought prior to the
publication of Keynes’ General Theory in 1936 did
not favor Governnment spending for stabilization pur-
poses.8 There was some opposition to an enlarged
OCTOBER 1970
T
ihe crowding-out phenomenon may be described in conven-
tional niathemnatical symbols in the following manner:
a) Real crowding out
dY’
dMa 0
b) Nominal crowding out
dY
dM = 0






Y = total spending, C = Government spending, and M =
money supply.
Relation (b) most closely represents the empirical crowding-
nut results reported in studies cited in footnote 2.
nmnre detailed discussion of classical, neo-classical and
Keynes’ early views on crowding out will be prmented in a
forthcoming Working Paper of the Federal Reserve Bank
of St. Louis.
or
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role for Government spending purely from a philoso-
phical view, but much of the criticism of increased
Government intervention was based on crowding-out
theory.
Adam Smith, for example, opposed extensive Gov-
ernment involvement for both philosophical and
crowding-out reasons. For the most part, Smith (writ-
ing in 1776) considered Governnient labor “unproduc-
tive,” and condemned the transfer of resources from
the private sector, whether through taxation or bor-
rowing. Borrowing funds from the public to finance
Government spending was asserted to involve the
“destruction of some capital which had before existed
in the country; by the per-version of some portion of
the annual produce which had before been destined
for the maintenance of productive labour, towards
that of unproductive labour.”° Smith believed that
“saving is spending,” because one man’s saving
becomes another man’s investment. Later classical
economists, such as John Stuart Mill and J. B, Say,
writing primarily in the first half of the nineteenth
century, saw in Adam Smith’s maxim a guarantee of
full employment. That is, Government spending was
considered unnecessary as a stabilization tool, because
private investment was sufficient to utilize the funds
provided by private saving.
The most elementary case for crowding out may be
examined in a “Say’s Law” framework. Say’s Law is
widely known as “supply creates its own demand.”
More specifically, if output (supply of goods and
services) is determined by the behavior of profit
maximizing producers, competitive labor markets, the
existing stock of capital goods, and the state of tech-
nology, then relative prices wifi tend automatically to
adjust so as to eliminate a deficiency or excess of
demand. In an economy in which Say’s Law is op-
erative, attempts by the Government to increase total
spending, by raising Government expenditures and
financing the increasing budget by either borrowing
from the public or taxation, merely induce changes
in relative prices so as to reallocate the same level of
real output.
The two cases — bond- and tax-financed Govern-
ment expenditures — involve changes in the structure
of prices (principally interest rates) to restore
equilibrium at full employment, so they represent the
tendency of a market economy ultimately to neu-
tralize disturbances (in this instance budgetary
9
Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations (New York: Random
House, Inc., 1937), p. 878.
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shocks). Without the Government’s presence, private
propensities to spend the full-employment level of
real income for either consumption or investment sum
to one as a consequence of automatic price adjust-
ments; adding a Government propensity to spend
correspondingly reduces private propensities, in order
to maintain total propensities to spend equaling one.’°
Neo-elassical business cycle theories became an im-
portant part of economic stabilization literature in
the early twentieth century. One of these theories,
over-investment financed by “forced” saving, was
equally applicable for any sector favored over others
for loan extension by the banking system. If, for ex-
ample, the Government were to borrow from banks
to finance its investment spending, the increased pur-
chasing power of the Government would allow it to
bid resources away from other sectors and, under full-
employment conditions, drive up the price level. The
higher price level would serve as a deterrent to “real”
consumer or private investment spending which
would otherwise have taken place.
A good example of this view is found in the testi-
mony of the English economist, R. C. Hawtrey, be-
fore the Macmillan Committee in 1930. Hawtrey
denied the usefulness of Government spending, re-
gardless of financing even under depression conditions:
On the matter of government spending [to bring
England out of her stagnationl, Hawtrey stated that
whether the spending came out of taxes or loans
from savings, the increased governmental expendi-
tures would merely replace private expenditures.
He even considered the “radical” idea of government
spending out of new bank credit, but predicted that
the result of such a policy would be inflationary and
a threat to the gold standard, thus forcing up the
bank rate of interest and causing credit contraction.
Such a plan, for him, would only defeat itself, since
government expenditures out of bank credit would
mean the end of cheap money for free enterprise.”
(Italics added)
Keynes advocated Government spending as a stim-
ulative economic measure twelve years before the
publication of The General Theory, but he attached
the “rider” that such spending should be financed by
monetary expansion.tm2 He emphasized (in 1929) that
tmOSee, for example, Culbertson, p. 333.
I ~Lawrence R. Klein, The Keynesian Revolution (London:
The Macmillan Company, 1968), pp. 45-46. Hawfrey’s
business cycle theory was based on easy money creating
additional working capital and inducing inventory
investment.
12
Roy Forbes Harrod, The Life of John Maynard Keynes
(New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1951), p. 441.
Keynes was only one of a number of economists of the
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the central bank had the power to defeat expan-
sionary fiscal actions and thus - nsure that the
expenditure financed 1w the Treaswv was at the ex-
pense of other business enterprise.”~ The British
Treasury. however, like 1-lawtrey, took the position
that Govei-nment spending, regardl.ess of financing,
simply displaced private spending.
Keynes continued to press his fiscal policy argu-
ments in the years preceding Time General Theory,
but eventually downgraded the necessity’ of mone-
tary expansion accompanying increased Government
spending in order for such spending to have an ex-
pansionary effect. Development of the liquidity pref-
erence theomy of interest and the fiscal multiplier
theory, particularly the latter, were the keys to
Keynes’ ability to shift money into the background of
his analysis. The liquidity preference concept led to
the idea that mnore efficient utilization of the existing
money stock (increased velocity) was encouraged by
increased Government expenditures, while the mathe-
matical formulation of the multiplier (by H. F. Kahn,
a student of Keynes) indicated that the increased
taxes and saving generated by the rise in Govern-
mnent-indueed income would be just enough to cover
the financing of the deficit.
Keynes’ General Theory View of
Fiscal Crowding Out
A detailed explanation of the workings of the mul-
tipher was one of the chief contributions of The
General Theory, as was the discussion of the qualifica-
tions of multiplier analysis. The investment multiplier
(k), wrote Keynes, “tells us that, when there is an
increment of aggregate investment, income will in-
crease by an amount which is k times the incre-
ment “ The principle of the multiplier provides
Twenties and Thirties who advocated govermoeotal deficit
spending to spur ecoaomic activity. Twelve University of
Chicago economists, for example, recommended deficit
spending in a 1932 memorandum to a member of Congress:
“Convinced that pump—priming deficits would induce at
best only temporary revival, the Chicago economists recoin-
mended that deficits should continue until recovery was in-
disputably estahlished. These would he financed by selling
new issues of bonds to the reserve banks or by exchanging
them for bank deposits and Federal Reserve notes, See 3.
Ronnie Davis, “Henry Simons, the Radical: Some Docu-
mentary Evidence,” History of Political Economy, Fall, 1969,
pp. 389-90.
l:rSee John Maynard Keynes, Essays in Persuasion (New
York: Hnrcourt, Brace and Company, 1932), p. 126.
14~
Keynes,The General Theory, p. 115. The multiplier con-
cept may he formalized as AY = kAl where AY is the
change in income, Al is the change in investment and ki s
the multiplier. Investusent refers to outlays on newly- cre-
ated plant and equipment and housing, and additions to
inventories. A similar multiplier is developed for changes
in Government expenditures (AC).
“an explanation of how fluetuoti.ons in the amount of
investmem.it, xvh;eh are aeomparativesv small propor-
tion of the national mmseome., are capable of generating
fh.metuations in aggregate. employment and income so
much greater in ampl;tude than themselve.s.”11
The. multiplier concept of an ~ncre.ment of new in-
vestule.nt spending being transrm.ttc.d from pocket to
oeket and thereby lncreas~mliztotal spending by sonIc
multspl.e is easier to grasp ~ntu~tive.ly- than mnathe.mati.-
eally. Keynes, himself searching for the proper mnathe-
.maticai rationale for his deceit spend;ng ideas, was
quick to seize. and popularize .Kahu’s verslon, He and
Kahn re.ali.ze.d sori:m. of the limitations of their formal
multiplier theory, hut tile scores of articles published
dur;ng tile. past three de.eade.s. wh~ehclarify or repn-
cliate ‘the Keynesian multiplier,” suggest tile i.nade—
quacy of its treatment in Time General Theory.
The. significance of time mnultipiier may he examined1
from thc:m erowd;ng-out point of view’, to tl’me extc.nt that
the rnultiplie.r represents caus.al re.iations rathe.r than. tile.
cx. post tautology that the change in income. must, by
definition, equal some multiplier times the increment
of investment.ty Keynes, in Time General Theory,
provided one of the most cogent and clear crowding-
out arguments to be found. Although he wished to
mnove money to a supporting rather than leading role
in his General Theory analysis, he recognized that
monetary influences could overcome his newly de-
veloped multiplier and liquidity preference constructs.
Contrary to expressions found in the. pre.sent “con-
ventional wisdom, Keynes hedged his arguments
eorls~derably.He pointed, out that,
if, for example, a Government employ’s 100,000
additional mmmcml on public works, amId if the multi-
plier ... is 4, it is slot safe to assume tllat aggregate
emplovmnent will increase by 400,000. For the new
policy mnav have adccrsc m’cactioos on irmvestnmcnt
ill other directions Tile mnetlmod of finamleimlg the
policy’ and the increased workimlg cash, required by’
the increased emnploymmsent amId tlle associated rise of
prices, mnay have tile effect (If mcreasing the rate of
interest and so retam’cling inccstnment, in. other three—
[ions, mulless the monetary authority takes steps to the
contrary; \vllilst, at the same time, the increased cost
0
f capital goods will reduce their margmal efficiency
‘~Th’id.,p. 122.
:moR. F. Kahn ( Econonmic Journal, 1931, p. 188) was quite
aware of the causal vs. tautological nature of tile equality
henveen the increase in. the rate (If investment expenditure
arid the subsequent streams of generatmd saving. The equal—
i.tv, b.c wrote, ‘far froin being tile logical consequence of
susmmmiug an infinite geometrical progression, is ill reality’
self—evident in nature...”
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The multiplier liulitation outlined above by Keynes
can be sumumarized yvidun the conventional IS-Lid
curve franlework. In the IS-Lid system, a set of
equatiom~s is postulated regarding propensities to
spend, to save, and to hold mnoney balances)5 The
system may be reci.ueed to two equations. One con-
tains various combmati.ons of income (I’) and interest
rates (r) at which investment equals saving; til~.5is
referred to as the IS curve and represents the real
sector of the economy. Tile other equation contains
various comhinatiou.s of Y and r at which money die-
manded equals the money stock i.n existence; this is
labeled the Li,:i curve and represe.nts the financial
sector. The. two e.quatiomls may then be solved simnul—
taneousiy to determni.ne eqtmuibrimimu values of tile in-
terest rate and incomne,
If the LM curve. is steeply sloped as shown in part
(A) of the accompanying figure, the increase in Gov-
eminent spending re.flected in th.e rightward shift of
the IS curve affects’ a sharp rise, in interest rates (from
1
Keynes, The General Theory, pp. 119-20. (Italics added
except for “fall”)
15See, for examimpie, Garmloer Ackiey, Macroaconovmzc Thao’ry
(New York: The Macnlil.ian Comllpaay, 1961), pp. 3.59-98.
r, to r2) and little or no change in income (Y1 to Ym).
A sharply rising Lid curve inlplies that the retarding
effects of such actions on private investment are sub-
stamltiai, Only by shifti.ng the LM cnrve to the right,
through momletary expansion for example7, \vill a sig-
nificant rise in income, occur (from Ym to Y1). Keynes,
by mentioning this nmulh’ph’er limitation, supplied a
strong theoretical basis for the crowding-out thesis,
and thd’rehv shifted the discussion to a quantitative
plane invoi.ving determination of the slopes of the
IS-LM curves and the substitutability of Government
and private, spending.
Keynes recognized a second svay, based on business
psychology, in which Government spending could
crowd out private spending. “With the confused
psychology which often prevails, the Government pro-
gramme may, through its effect on ‘confidence’, in-
crease liquidity-preference or diminish the marginal
effiei.ency of capital, which, again, may retard other
investment unless measures are taken to offset iL”m
lCKeynes, The General Theory, p. 120. Daniel Throop Smith,
“is Deficit Spending Practical?”, Hareard Busi’nc,s-s Review
(Vol. 18, 1939), pp. 38-9, was particularly concerned about
the business confidence aspect mmf the crowding-out thesis.
A continued experiemsce with deficits which do not produce
sustained recovery, as in this country, or a recent infla-
tion and collapse, as in continental European countries,
is likely to make a deficit matter for concern and anxiety,
And, if there ii disbelief in the benefits of a deficit, then
to the private investor, and this will require an actual
fail in the rate of interest to offset it,
tm7
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If the increase in Government spending (shown by
the shift of IS to IS’ in part B of Figure 1) has an
adverse effect on liquidity preference, the LM curve
shifts to the left (LM’) and income increases only
slightly from Y to Y2. If the ntmarginal efficiency of
capital is adversely influenced, this may be shown by
a leftward shift of the IS curve from IS’ to IS”, also
resulting in a small increase in income from Y1 to Y5.
The magnitude of these shifts of the curves depends,
of course, on the assumed response of “business con-
fidence” to increased Government spending.
Keynes also noted a potential multiplier leakage in
the hypothesized tendency of the marginal propensity
to consume to diminish as employment increases. This
introduces the state of economic activity as an influ-
ence on the efficacy of the multiplier. Thus Keynes
could, without reservation, recommend any sort of
public works (pyramid building. wars) during periods
of unemployment, “if only from the diminished cost
of relief expenditure, provided that we can assume
that a smaller proportion of income is saved when
unemployment is greater; but they may become a
more doubtful proposition as a state of full employ-
ment is approached. Furthermore, if our assumption
is correct that the marginal propensity to consume
falls off steadily as we approach full employment, it
follows that it will become more and more trouble-
the new money spent by the goeernrnant may well be
snore than offset by additional withdrawals of ‘pricate
money which would otherwise be spent. Likewise, if eon-
sunler incomes do increase immediately as a result of the
deficit, business may anticipate that the increase is tem-
porary and refrain from long-term commitments.
Consumer income arises primarily out of the pro-
cesses of the production and distribution of goods and
services. Therefore, if private spending decreases by as
many dollars as government spending increases (and it
takes only a very small proportionate decrease in private
spending to offset a large proportionate increase in gov-
ernment spending), then on balance there is no net in-
crease in consumer income. Furthermore, even if there is
an immediate net increase in consumer income, there mny
be enough flexibility in our economic system in the form
of idle capacity, especially during a depression, to obviate
any necessity of spending on capital goods to provide
consumer goods, Also, if there is an actual increase in
consumer income and spending but it is believed that
the demand is an artificial one dependent npon a con-
tinuation of government deficits which cannot last in-
definitely, business will be loath to make long-tenn
capital commitments. In such circumstances business at
most will make tip deferred maintenance and build up
inventories creating an artificial “boomlet” which is not
likely to develop into a sustained recovery. This seems
to have been particsmlarly true in 1936 and 1937. (italics
added)
This analysis implies that, dependent upon the time pe-
riod specified. Government spending may not only crowd
out an equal magnitude of private spending but an even
greater amount. The multiplier would then be negative
rather than zero or positive.
some to secure a further given increase of employ-
ment by further increasing investment.”20
A related leakage was that of an increase in em-
ployinent which tends, “owing to the effect of dimin-
ishing returns in the short period, to increase the
proportion of aggregate income which accrues to the
enterpreneurs, whose individual mnasginal propensity
to consume is probably iess than the average for the
community as a whole.25 Moreover, the impact of
the nlultiplier mnight be reduced by those unemployed
consumers formerly existing on negative savings, pri-
vate or public, whose employment would diminish
negative savings, and thereby, the marginal propen-
sity to consume.
An additional caveat to those who would mechan-
istically apply the snultiplier was that, “In any case,
the multiplier is likely to be greater for a small net
increment of investment than for a large increment;
so that, where substantial changes are in view, we
must be guided by the average value of the multi-
plier based on the average marginal propensity to
consume over the range in question.”22
These multiplier modifications and many more can
be found in the post-General Theory literature,2~but
enough has been introduced here to indicate that the
value of the Governntment spending multiplier may be
positive, zero or negative. It should be pointed out
that although Keynes was aware of some of the lim-
itations of the multiplier (as demonstrated above),
he did not emphasize them, partly because of his
desire to put a simple rationale for Government spend-
20
Keynes, The General Theory, p. 127. One ialplication of this
analysis is that increased Government spending, for the rea-
sons given, may not only he less effective at stimulating the
economy near full employment than at substantially’ less than




See Hugo ilegelnod The Multiplier Theory (New York:
Augustus M. Kelicy Publishers, 1966) p. 73: “The basic
weakness of the multiplier theory lies in its assumptions,
which in fact eliminate the real problems involved and
make tile theory almost a truism.”
One exaolple of post-Keynesian criticism of the mechani-
cal application of the multiplier can be found in Gardner
Ackley, “The Multiplier Time Period: Money, Inventories,
and Flexibility,” America,m Economic Reeiew (June, 1951)
pp. 350-368. Ackley notes that the existence of inventories
serves as a huller providing a potentially long and variable
lag between a change in consumer expenditures and a
change in production rates. An argument made by Milton
Friedman is that Government expendithre increases may be
viewed by consumers as adding only to transitory income
(i.e., temporary income,) He argues that the marginal
propensity to consume out of transitory income is zero. See
Mlilton Friedman, A Theory of the Consumption Function
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 26.
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ing during the depression in the hands of the policy-
makers as expeditiously as possible.24
A Basic Keynesian Framework for
Crowding-Out Analysis
A number of attempts were made after Keynes to
spell out more formally the relationships governing
the conditions under which Government spending
would add to total spending or crowd out a significant
volume of private spending. Richard Musgrave de-
veloped one of the most efficient frameworks for
analyzing the crowding-out phenomenon of those con-
structed in the approximately three decades follow-
ing The General Theory.
25
There are three basic sectors of the economy and
three basic “effects” in the Musgrave framework.2°
2~
The crowding-out issue emerged in a different context in
at least one of Keynes’ post-General Theory essays. In
Paul Davidson, “Keynes’s Finance Motive,” Oxford Economic
Papers (March 1965), pp. 48-49, Keynes is quoted from
no April 18, 1939 letter to the London Times, in which he
explains his approach to financing Government expenditures
for rearmament: “if an attempt is made to borrow them
(the savings which will result from the increased produc-
tion of non-consumption (war) goodsl before they exist,
as the Treasury have done once or twice lately, a stringency
in the money market must result, since, pending the ex-
penditure, the liquid resources acquired by the Treasury
must be at the expense of the normal liquid resources of
the bnnks and of the public.”
2m
See Richard A. Musgrave, The Theory of Public Finance
(New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1959), pp. 526-55.
Others outlining frameworks under which crowding out
might be analyzed include Alvin H. Hansen, Monetary
Theory and Fiscal Policy (New York: McGraw-Full Inc.,
1949), pp. 187-73, and Abba P. Lerner, “The Burden of
the National Debt,” in Income, Employment and Public
Policy, Essays in Honor of Alvin H. Hansen (New York:
W. W. Norton and Compaoy, Inc., 1948), pp. 255-75.
Lerner, for example (p. 269), states that ‘The sale of gov-
emment bonds diminishes liquidity, tends to raise interest
rates, and discourages investment, The government should
therefore not borrow unless it wishes to bring about these
deflationary effects.”
26





(4) 1 U/Ma (hj3)/{3
(5) Ma=MMt
(6) Mm = 1/V • Y
(7) G=T
Y = income, C = consumption, I = investment, G =
Govermnent spending, T = tax yield, M = total money
supply, Ma = asset money, Mm = transactions money,
V = income velocity, i = “the” market interest rate,
c = marginal propensity to consume, w = a wealth para-
meter, e = an investment parameter, U = bond coupon
bill, ~ = fraction of claims (asset money and Government
debt) people wish to hold in form of Government debt, n =
intercept term, d = intercept term.
The Government budget constraint, G = T, could be
modified to permit deficit finance through changes in money
or Government bonds. A rough approximation of the Gov-
ernment budget constraint for the above system of equa-
tions might take the form G = T + AM + AU.
4
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Government, consumer, and investment spending com-
prise the three sectors, and income, wealth, and sub-
stitution are the three effects. Income effects are those
related to changes in disposable income. Wealth ef-
fects occur with changes in the level of wealth, the
ratio of wealth to income or changes in the level or
structure of debt claims (money and/or Government
bonds). Substitution effects result from saving or
spending incentives provided by a particular Govern-
mental tax or expenditure policy. Income and wealth
effects are interdependent; the initial effect may be
one or the other, but both effects become operative
as the adjustment proceeds. For example, an increase
in investment may occur as a result of a change in
income because of a change in the propensity to in-
vest, The income effect would be followed by a wealth
effect as changes in the interest rate and the ratio of
wealth to income occur over the period of adjustment.
Musgrave assumes that consumption is altered
through income effects and/or \vealth effects. Invest-
sIlent is influenced by changes in income and/or (via
interest rates) changes in the level or structure of
claims, while the substitution effect, which does not
appear explicitly in the model, may he operative
through changes in profitability due to taxation,
Wealth and income effects are seen most clearly
by comparing the private sector’s response to a variety
of policy actions. The accompanying table illustrates
a basic cataloguing of budget policies within the Mus-
grave framework. It gives various combinations of
stabilization actions by arraying changes in the supply




Change in Supply of Money
Change in
Supply of Debt
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We assume that the ratio of collsumption to income
will increase (that is, the ratio of saving to income
\vill fall) with increases in the supply of money, or
(with some qualification) the supply of public debt
and the level of investment will rise with an increase
in the supply of money and will fall with an increase
in the supply of debt. It is then possible to determine
whether each policy smx is expansive or restrictive.
Policies 3, 4, and S are expansionary, policies 6, 7,
and 9 are restrictive, and policies 1, 2, and 5 contain
ambiguous effects. Policy 2, a deficit financed by debt
issue, most closely approximates the bond-financed’
crowding-out case. Policy 1 approximates the tax-fi-
nanced crowding-out case. Note that neither policy 1
or 2 involves changes in the supply of money. These
two cases will be examined separately-, to ascertain
which factors are involved in deternlining whether
purely budgetary actions result in an expansionary
effect on the economy, or sisnply crowd out private
spending.
Bond-Financed Changes in Governnien.t
Lxpen.djtures
What actually happens in the case of bond-financed
Government expenditures depends to a large extent
on the movement of the interest rate. There will be
an expansionary income effect (Government spend-
ing adds directly to incomne) which may be aug-
mented bya stimulative wealth effect on consump-
tion (more bonds held by the public), if the interest
rate remains relatively unresponsive.27 If the increase
in the supply of Government bonds is accompanied
by a sharp rise in the interest rate, the expansionary
inconle effect could be countered by (1) a smaller
net wealth effect (since the market value of the Gov-
ernment debt varies inversely witll the interest rate);
(2) displacement of pnvate investment, which re-
spouds negatively to a rise in the bond interest rate;
and (3) a diversion of funds from consumption into
2T
The wealth effect, as described by Musgmave, does not
consider the issue of future tax liabilities associated with
Government debt. Even if the interest rate responds negli-
gibly to an increase in Government bonds, the rise in the
value of tile debt (pmssitive wealth effect) may be partially
offset by the discounted future tax liability required to pay
the interest on the debt. The inlpact of the future tax liability
on aggregate demand in the current period depeods upon (a)
the degree to which the bond-holding public considers
future tax liabilities, (b) the mnturity of the debt, and (c)
the anticipations of the public as to the nature of tile future
taxes to be levied (on tile income from labor or capital)
to pay the interest on the debt. See Boris P. Pesek and
Thomas P. Saving, Moucy, Wealth and Economic Theory
(New York: The Macmillan Company, 1967), Chapter 10,
who argue that the tax liability offset to the wealth effect is
only partial and not total as sonIc analysts have saggested.
Government bond purchase (voluntary saving), hav-
ing an initially restrictive effect.
The response of total spending to bond-financed
Government expenditures is ambiguous. If savers are
indifferent between the holding of bonds and money,
the interest rate does not rise, the net market value
of the debt increases by this means of financing, and
a strong wealth effect may be realized. At the other
extreme, savers insisting on holding a fixed ratio of
money and debt would result in a rise in the interest
rate, no change in the value of the debt (gains from
the acquisition of new bonds being offset by capital
losses suffered from the holding of old bonds), and
no wealth effect.
Actual conditions, according to Musgrave, fall some-
where in the middle. During a depression, the interest
rate is likely to be relatively unresponsive. The im-
plication is that the interest rate is likely to he most
responsive during periods of rapid expansion. A more
detailed model might consider the effects of price
expectations and varying default risks on interest
rates (and, consequently, private spending), and
present a wider spectrum of private and public assets.
The introduction of fractional reserve banldng
(which is excluded from the above discussion) into
the system complicates the argument somewhat, but
the essential principles remain unchanged. In prac-
tice, as Buchanan points out, commercial bank pur-
chases of Government bonds out of excess reserves
permit the full expansionary effect to take place
(money creation), but bonds purchased when reserves
are not in excess have the same effect as borrowing
from the public. In the latter case, “The expansionary
effects of the public spending side of the deficit are,
to a considerable extent, offset by the reduction in
private investment caused by the tightening up of
funds available for private securities.”28
Tax-Financed Changes in Governni..en.t
Expenditures
The most obvious crowding out of private expendi-
tures by Government spending, involving the involun-
tary transfer of funds from the private to the Govern-
sIlent sector, is the case in rvhich expenditures are
financed by taxation. A balanced-budget multiplier
equal to one (total spending increases by an amount
equal to an increase in Government spending financed
by taxes) is the usual upper limit assigned to tax-
financed Government expenditures.. This result is
2~
Jasnes M. Buchanan, The Public Finances (Homesvood,
ill.: Richard D. Irwin, 1965), p. 99.
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0ne observer has relied strongly on a positive balanced-
budget multiplier to support his argument for the expan-
siveness of bond-financed Government expenditures. See
Robert Eisner, “Fiscal and Monetary Policy Reconsidered,”
American Economic Review (December 1969), pp. 897-
905. Eisner finds Government expenditures, regardless of
the financing, to be the controlling exogenous variable in
slowing or stimulating the economy (“monetary measures
are likely ultimately to be as limited in their impact in
combating inflation as they have long been recognized to
be limited in combating a deep depression Public
works or, more generally, government investment and eon-
sualptlon, reemerge in their early role as prime weapons in
the arsenal against depression and take on analogous im-
portance in any struggle against inflation,” p. 904). His
model shows that whether Government spending financed
by bond issue is expansionnry (increase in prices) or offset
depends on the interest and wealth elasticities of real
money and commodity demand. He presents no empirical
justification for his conclusion that bond-financed Govem-
meat expenditures are expansionary, but concludes that to
argue against an expansion “would he to argue that a
deficit-financed increase in Covemment expenditures can
be deflationary while the same increase in Government
expenditures would be inflationary if fully supported by
taxes.” (p. 903) His balanced—budget multiplier analysis
ignores its numerous limitations as discussed above,
30
james Buchanan provides a list of seven assumptions under-
lying the unitary balanced-budget multiplier in The Public
Finances, pp. 78-80. These are: 1) The entire amount of
the Govemment spending change must take the form of
purchases of real goods and services currently produced;
2) the balanced-budget change must be financed through
taxes having about the same effects as the personal income
ages from the multiplier, and conclude that, in es-
sence, a rise in Government spending financed by
taxation may crowd out an equivalent or greater
magnitude of private spending.31 The basis for their
reasoning is that, although the Government’s marginal
propensity to spend exceeds that of the private sec-
tor, Government spending is subject to significant
leakages before its influence on private spending is
realized.
The existence of these “leakages” in a governmental
tax-expenditure program — tile nonredistributional
effects on private consumption, the purchase of items
on capital account and of goods from abroad — is,
(If course, well known, though no attempt seems to
have been made to take account of them in the
literature. Possibly some (If the writers had them in
mind but considered them unimportant, since pre-
sumnbly none of them considered the unit multiplier
figure as more than an approximation to tile empiri-
cal magnitude in view of the recognized qualifica-
tions. The magnitude of tile leakages may indeed be
rather small, and it is very tempting to conclude
that if 10 per cent of the government’s balanced
budget expenditure is “leaked,” the multiplier will be
reduced from unity to say about 0.9. However, we
nrgue now that fairly small leakages can even pro-
duce a negative balanced budget multiplier.
Thus tile multiplier will be positive, zero, or
negative as the marginal propensity to snve and im-
port of the private sector is greater than, equal to,
or less than k, the government’s ‘marginal propensity
to leak.’32
Alternative Frameworks for Analysis
of the Crowding-Out Effect
If, as has been maintained, the method by which
C;overnment spending is financed matters to both
private and overall spending, it would seem that cur-
rent analysis should explicitly account for it in dis-
cussions of the Government expenditure multiplier.
Quite often, however, current analysis ignores the
potential crowding out of private spending when Gov-
ernment expenditures are financed by bond sales or
taxation,
tax; 3) the public spending must not exert substitution ef-
fects on the pattern of private spending; 4) the marginal
propensity to save for taxpayers must be equal to the
marginnl propensity to save for the suppliers of Govern-
ment goods and services; 5) investment spending must not
be altered significantly by the budgetary change; 6) the
monetary-banking framework must pennit attempted changes
in spending to be carried out; 7) individual behavior In
earning income must not be directly affected by the bud-
getary change.
~~W. J. Baumol and Maurice H. Peston, “More on the Multi-
plier Effects of a Balanced Budget,” American Economic
Review (March 1955).
l2Ibid., pp. 144 and 145.
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generally deduced from the assumption that the
Government’s propensity to spend for goods and
services out of tax revenue is 100 per cent, while
private propensities to spend after-tax income are less
than 100 per cent.29
Most simple models, including Musgrave’s, do not
allow adequately for potential leakages from the Gov-
ernment balanced-budget multiplier, but by injecting
debt considerations into the discussion of an increase
in Government expenditures met by a rise in taxes,
Musgrave uncovers potentially adverse influences on
private spending. If an initial rise in income is gen-
erated by a balanced-budget change, a drain on asset
money would develop (because of the increased
transactions demand for money) which tends to have
a detrimental effect on investment. The rise in income
relative to a constant money supply may have a de-
pressing effect on consumption, especially so the more
the drop in net wealth (that is, a fall in the value of
the debt) produced by a rising interest rate.
Most observers, however, ignore debt considera-
tions in their analysis of the limitations of the unitary
balanced-budget multiplier. The large number of as-
sumptions necessary to the determination of a uni-
tary balanced-budget multiplier, disregarding debt
problems, reflects to some extent its implausibility.30
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One possible reason for this oversight is that the
numerous attempts to clarify the principles enunciated
in Keynes’ General Theory have resulted in serious
oversimplification of the complete Keynesian doctrine,
This oversimplification has taken place at both basic
and advanced levels of economic analysis. At the
basic level, the “45-degree diagrams” popularized in
principles text books leave no room for budget financ-
ing considerations.:u Similarly, the fundamental two-
equation Keynesian model popularized in elementary
text books, and its usual extensions, encourage the
mechanical “cranking out” of fiscal multiphers which
omit adequate treatment of the financing issue.34
The Hicksian IS-LM analysis, fonnulated to sum-
marize Keynesian macroeconomic theory, represents
oversimplification at a fairly advanced level (see
figure 1). An increase in Government spending is
demonstrated by a rightward shift of the IS curve,
which, as explained above, may result in a rise in
both the interest rate and income. If the analysis stops
here (as it frequently does), it is difficult to discern
how the increased expenditure is financed. In reality,
the shift from an equilibrium to a disequilibrium po-
sition may bring about simultaneous changes in in-
come, wealth, interest rate, money demand and
money supply variables, and tax functions, depend-
ing on the source of finance. An approximation of the
effects of movements in the key variables, as a new
equilibrium position is established, may be achieved
by altering the slopes and positions of the IS and LM
curves, but the framework of analysis, without an
explicit Government budget constraint, is not condu-
cive to such shifts,35
William L. Silber sets forth conditions under which
Government spending can be contractionary in a
properly specified IS-LM framework.3° Utilizing a
framework of analysis similar to that of Musgrave, he
asSee, for example, Paul Samnuelson, Economics, 8th edition




Substituting (1) into (2) and solving for Y gives:
Y = a/i—b + I/i—b + G/1—b where
bY/hG = i/i — b = Government spending multiplier
~~“The Hicks-Hansen diagram has elegant simplicity which
appeals to many. It has the disadvantage, however, that
most of the ‘works’ are out of sight. This means that we
need to use another diagram (or an extra mental calcula-
tion) to determine the effect of a displacement of the
equilibrium on the other variables of onr system,” See
Ackley, p. 372.
36William L. Silber, “Fiscal Policy in IS-LM Analysis: A Cor-
rection”, forthcoming in the Journal of Money Credit and
Banking.
finds that a rise in the supply of Government bonds
which incrcases wealth also increases the demand for
money ( represented in the IS—LM framework by’ a
leftward shift of the LM curve). Silber concludes:
it has been demonstrated that traditional IS-LM
analysis has not treated the bond-finance and new
money-finance cases of government deficits symmetri-
cally. When proper treatment is given to tile former
case, we found that in the simple world of IS-LM
analysis government expenditures financed by selling
bonds to the public can be contrnctionary. Even when
GNP does go up due to AG, the increase that occurs
is overstated in the traditional (but incomplete)
IS-LM model of income determination. The failure
to incorporate the monetary effects of debt finance
into the UI function is the major source of confu-
sion. While other studies have treated this ques-
tion, it has never been formally incorporated into
IS-LM models. This had led to incorrect conclusions
regarding the multiplier affects of government
spending.
The many income-expenditure econometric models
which have emerged in the 1960’s appear to be well-
suited to handle the problems of simultaneity and
the Government budget constraint. Unfortunately,
some explicit provision for the fact that Government
expenditures must be financed by taxing, borrowing
from the public, or money creation has often been
omitted from monetary and fiscal policy simulations
of these large models. A model which includes, for
example, Government purchases of goods and services,
transfer payments, taxation, the change in the sales
of Government bonds to the public, and the change
in the stock of high-powered money, should be closed
by the specification of the relationship between the
items representing Govermnent expenditures and the
items representing Government “income.”
Closure of the above system implies that in simu-
lating the economy’s response to alternative monetary
and fiscal actions, it is not possible to change only one
of the five variables at a time when evaluating mul-
tipliers. Carl Christ provides the following example
relating Government expenditures to Government
receipts:
if government purchases are increased, then
either transfers must be cut, or tax payments must
rise, or government debt must be issued to the pri-
vate sector, or high powered money must be issued,
or some combination of these. The effect of the in-
crease in government purchases will depend upon
what combination of them is ehosen.ai
tm7
Cnrl Christ, “Monetary and Fiscal Policy in Macroeconomic
Models” (Paper presented at the Sixteenth Annual Con-
ference on the Economic Outlook, Ann Arbor, Michigan,
November 14-15, 1968), p. 102.
Page 22FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS OCTOBER, 1970
Thus, those models which purport to be able to say
something like “A $1 billion increase of Government
purchase of goods and services results in a one-quar-
ter increase in income of $2.5 billion” should also
make statements regarding another fiscal/monetary
variable which changes in order for the statement to
have meaning. With no way to determine how the
$2.5 billion increase in income is generated, it may be
falsely attributed to a fiscal action when, in reality, a
monetary action is responsible. That is, if changes in
money are not held constant in the analysis, the esti-
mated increase in income arising from a change in
the independent fiscal policy variable may not be ac-
curately captured. Consequently, the model would
not measure accurately fiscal crowding out.
One analyst gives several examples of how, by
failure to incorporate correctly the Government bud-
- get constraint, a number of incomne-expenditure mod-
els overestimate the impact of Government actions
on income. His own reduced fonn empirical evidence
leads him to conclude that “These results are consist-
ent with a simple Keynesian multiplier from a deficit
financed by bond purchases, with respect to the in-
come of the private sector equal to zero.”tm8
Neglect of the Governmnent budget constraint is not
the only reason ~vhy fiscal crowding out has not ap-
peared in some strnctural econometric models. If such
monetary variables as money demand and supply
are omitted completely from the model, the “real”
sector of the economy — which normally includes Gov-
ernment spending actions — wifi, by default, dominate
income changes. In terms of IS-LM analysis, omission
of the LM curve (which reflects money demand and
supply functions) would severely restrict the possible
emergence of the crowding-out effect.
Evidence presented in this Review is consistent
with the thesis that failure to identify monetary vari-
ables adequately leads to suppression of the crowd-
ing-out effect. Michael Keran found that the use of
interest rates rather than monetary aggregates as
monetary variables in his reduced-form equations re-
sulted in the elimination of the fiscal crowding-out
phenomenon.” His sttidy suggests that proper spe-
cification of monetary actions, in terms of monetary
aggregates rather than interest rates, assists empirical
estimators in uncovering fiscal crowding-out influences.
tm5
Robert Auerbach, The Income Effects of the Government
Deficit (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Chicago, 1969),
Appendix A and p. 49.
OOMichael W. Keran, “Selecting a Monetary Indicator — Evi-
dence from the United States and Other Developed Coun-
tries” (this Review), September 1970.
Karl Brunner and Allan Meltzer have developed
(in a preliminary paper) a framework of equations
couched in terms of elasticities of interest rates, prices,
wealth, and anticipations. Their approach to macro-
economic analysis, in contrast to the standard Keyne-
sian framework, emphasizes the whole spectrum of
relative price adjustments (which includes changes
in the prices of goods and services as well as interest
rate responses) to monetary and fiscal actions.4°“The
role of the relative price process is particularly exam-
ined together with the responses resulting from the
interaction of the asset markets. The orthodox Keyne-
sian view of a ‘reliable and direct’ effect of fiscal
policy on income disolves rather thoroughly. The an-
alysis establishes that monetary and fiscal policy are
equally ‘indirect’ and dependent on stimuli conveyed
by relative price changes and adjustments in wealth
positions.”41
Brunner and Meltzer believe their analysis “pro-
vides a foundation for the proposition that changes
in budgetary variables (Government expenditures or
taxes) exert by themselves relatively little effect on
economic activity or price-levels. The crucial effect
depends on the financing.” They find that the Gov-
ernment expenditures elasticity of aggregate demand
“varies between less than 1/5 up to unity with
the higher values achieved through the injection of
base money. “The pure fiscal effect of Government
expenditures thus amounts to at most 1/5 measured
in ternms of elasticities.”41
Even the more conventional econometric models
may uncover crowding-out influences, if interest rate
effects are permitted to develop over a substantial
period. Private spending is curtailed over time by a
rise in interest rates generated by expanded Govern-
ment spending, but the result is not immediate. This
“‘Crowding out in a relative price context may be illustrated
by the following simple example: If a newly-issued Gov-
ernment construction contract enables a Government enter-
prisc to b~dagainst private firms for construction and other
workers in a near-fully employed community, the private
finns must raise wages to retain their workers. Those pri-
vate firms losing workers will probably have to curtail out-
put, while those retaining workers with higher wages may
attempt to pass along the higher costs in the form of price
increases. The higher prices would be most noticeable in
the construction sector, but, with the general rise in pur-
chasing power, could he transmitted throughout the eom-
immunity Also, the higher prices of residential construction
could cause households to shift expenditures away froom
housing into less expensive alternatives.
t1
Karl Brunner and Allan Meltzer, “Fiscal and Monetary
Policy in a Non-Keynesian World,” (paper prepared for
private circulation). p. 6.
llIhid, pp. 57 and 57a.
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is particularly trne of corporations whose decisions to
invest are based on the economic clinmate \vhieh exists
well before actual outlays are made. The specification
of the lags involving interest-sensitive private spend-
ing plans may play a strong role in determining the
time lag necessary for crowding out to occur.
The FEB-MIT model, which is characterized by
rather long lag structures, demonstrated complete
crowding out of private spending by Government
actions, when model simulations were tracked over a
long period. “In the long run, and by this we mean a
long run of ten or fifteen years, the [FEB-MIT]
model is classical in that the only permanent effect
of fiscal policy is to raise prices and the transactions
demand for nmoney and, in the presence of a fixed
supply of money, interest rates sufficiently to crowd
out enough real private expenditures that the ultimate
real inconme effect of Government spending is zero.”1m
Fiscal crowding out emerges in the reduced form
equations published in this Review only after a pe-
riod of time, even though it is a much shorter period
of time than that of the FEB-MIT model. Govern-
ment spending, as measured by high-employment ex-
penditures, exercises a strong influence on GNP
(assuming a constant money supply) in the current
quarter and the next quarter, but the Government-
spending effects wash out over approximately a one-
year period. These results should not be interpreted
to suggest that “Government spending doesn’t matter.”
It matters very much over a certain period. Moreover,
if Government spending were to accelerate rapidly
rather than be held to a once-and-for-all increase, the
inmpact on GNP would be considerable over the period
of acceleration and somewhat beyond.
Conclusion
A number of plausible theories have been devel-
oped over the years which substantiate the view
that Government expenditures, depending on the
source of finance, may crowd out a roughly equivalent
magnitude of private expenditures. This view, in fact,
was the dominant classical and neo-classical view,
persisting at least until the publication of Keynes’
General Theory.
Keynes himself discussed crowding out in detail in
The General Theory. He indicated that the fiscal
.1CEdw~dM. Gramlich, “Recent Experience with the FRB-
MIT Model,” (paper presented to the Committee on Bank-
ing and Credit Policy, New York, November 6, 1969), p~6.
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multiplier might not generate the increases in em-
ployment given by a mechanical manipulation of the
equations centering on his consumption function, be-
cause of the restrictive assunmptions upon which his
equations were based. Keynes noted several factors
tending to offset the influence of increased Govern-
nment expenditures: possible adverse reactions on pri-
vate investment, “confused” business psychology, and
a tendency of the nmarginal propensity to consume to
decline with rises in employment. -
A significant nunmber of additional limitations to the
Keynesian multiplier have been pointed out in the
post-General Theory literature. One of the most seri-
ous deficiencies of the fiscal multiplier appears to be
its asymmetry; that is, the crowding out of private
spending is theoretically more likely at full-employ-
ment than at considerably less than full-employnment
conditions. Since the unemploynment rate has rarely
exceeded seven per cent in the past three decades,
compared with an average unemployment rate of 18
per cent in the 1930’s, the crowding-out effect has
probably been much stronger in recent years than
during the period in which Keynesian multiplier the-
ory was developed.
Wealth, income, and substitution effects, important
factors in the determination of the degree of crowd-
ing out, are often incorporated in econometric models,
but failure to impose the Government budget con-
straint or treat adequately the monetary variables in
the system of equations probably has led to under-
statement of the crowding-out effect.
More research on the time interval of crowding-out
influences should be conducted to improve stabiliza-
tion policy recommendations. Articles published in
this Review suggest that Government expenditures
financed by taxes or borro\ving from the public are
important over a very short period, but their tendency
to crowd out private expenditures obviates any
significant, lasting influence. This conclusion is sup-
ported by other research, which indicates that crowd-
ing out does indeed occur, but over a much longer
time period)4 These results suggest that the main
dispute regarding the crowding out effect centers
on the length of time involved. The rationale and
some empirical verification of the existence of crowd-
ing out have been established — precise relationships
and time periods remain a subject of further research.
~‘Ibid.
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